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The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics

RICHARD K. ASHLEY *

I. Introduction

Upon first encounter, the idea of a critical social inquiry into international politics would appear to be a contradiction in terms. By its very nature, the sphere of international politics would seem to lack what a critical inquiry must presuppose. Whereas a critical social inquiry comprehends all social action against the background of community, the sphere of international politics would seem to lack a basis in community. Two propositions make the contradiction plain enough.

The first is that critical social scientific approaches, in their various guises, are inherently communitarian. In contrast to positivistic approaches to social inquiry, approaches meriting the label “critical” stress the community-shared background understandings, skills, and practical predispositions without which it would be impossible to interpret action, assign meaning, legitimate practices, empower agents, and constitute a differentiated, highly structured social reality. Such background understandings and preunderstandings might be entitled a “lebenswelt” with Husserl, a “ground plan” with Heidegger, a “disciplinary matrix” with Kuhn, a “common sense reality of everyday life” with Berger and Luckmann, a “habitus” with Bourdieu, an “episteme” or “dispositif” with Foucault, or simply a “background consensus” with Habermas. But whatever the label, critical social scientists understand such shared background knowledge and skills to be “the very ontological condition of human life in society as such” (Giddens, 1976: 19). Themselves the products of historical practices, such background knowledge and skills are seen to orient the parties’ interpretations of their worlds and themselves. They

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are seen to provide the framework, symbolic resources, and practical strategies for the coordination and legitimation of action, the disciplining of resistance, and, hence, the historical production and differentiation of the community, its boundaries, its objects, and its subjective agents.

The second proposition is advanced primarily by the preeminent tradition of international political theorizing, a tradition whose lineage can be traced from the contemporary figures of Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, John Herz, and Raymond Aron through the more distant figure of Niccolò Machiavelli. This is the tradition of political realism. Its relevant proposition is that international politics is characterized by anarchy, not community. Strictly speaking, realists submit, there is no international society worthy of the name community. Rather, there are multiple political communities, each circumscribed by the political reach of a sovereign state. Within state boundaries, social and political action might be founded on a reliable, practically effective basis in community-shared background knowledge. But across state boundaries, realists propose, no such basis in community knowledge can be said to exist. What purports to be evidence of international community—for instance, international law, standards of diplomatic practice, regimes of international trade, or moral norms of human rights—is in fact transient and contingent, not fundamental. What is fundamental in international politics, on this account, is power. Lacking secure grounding in a transnational community, international politics is fundamentally reducible to a strictly instrumental exercise of means among plural states. A pure positivity reigns.

Taken together, the two propositions suggest that critical social inquiry must stop, as it were, at the water's edge. To turn to international politics, the propositions suggest, is to turn to a domain that is intrinsically inhospitable to critical social inquiry. For an approach that presupposes the communitarian basis of social and political life cannot reasonably be pursued in a realm whose premier defining feature is precisely that it lacks community. Here, in international politics, critical inquiry finds its limits.

Such a conclusion is surely troubling on its face, but it becomes especially problematic for critical analysts when recent developments in internationalist thought are taken seriously. Consider just two:

1. One line of thought is put forth by liberal analysts who speak of “mounting global interdependence,” from global economics to global ecology, and of the growing significance of “transnational phenomena,” from tourism to terrorism. According to this line of speculation, the world is becoming more “interdependent.” Fewer and fewer of the decisions bearing on the material conditions of national societies are within the range of effective control of national governments. More and more of the processes and decisions that shape local and global political, economic, and environmental futures are controlled, if at all, by forces and actors that respect no national boundaries and that exceed the sovereign sway of the state. In the most extreme formulation of this theme, the modern state is said to face a crisis of competence—it cannot do its job—and a crisis of legitimacy—it can no longer reliably secure loyalties because it is increasingly perceived as unable to do its job. “The vessel of sovereignty,” according to the cliche, “is leaking.”
A second line of internationalist argument is put forth by more radical thinkers, from dependencia theorists through neo-Marxist world system analysts. This line of argument holds that "interdependence" is neither so new nor so symmetrical as liberal thinkers might tend to believe. It holds that the world economy is properly conceived as just that, a singular world economy having its origins in the 16th century, not a coincidence of so many national economies. There is, according to this line, a single worldwide division of labor, a capitalist world economy, structured in the form of a center–periphery hierarchy. Developments within individual "national economies," this line of argument holds, are not primarily to be accounted in terms of unique national experience. Rather, national developmental patterns are said to be attributable primarily to a society's situation in the world division of labor and to the capitalist world economy's own logic and phase of development. In the same way, national conditions of expansion and contraction, growth and crisis, are said to be explainable in terms of the capitalist world economy's own conditions of development, whether expansionary or critical, and the "world system" logic by which consequences are differentially visited upon central and peripheral peoples and regimes.

It should not be difficult to see that these and related lines of thought imply a problem for the critical social scientific study of politics in advanced capitalist societies. Although they differ in important ways, these lines of thought have in common the claim that national political developments are largely mediated or determined by international or transnational structures and relations. If this claim has merit, and if it is true that international political life, lacking an intersubjective basis in community, is beyond the scope of critical inquiry, then a troubling conclusion follows. Critical social scientists must acknowledge the limits of critical inquiry into domestic politics as well as international politics. They must concede that the critical study of politics in an advanced capitalist society is unable to reach beyond the bounds of domestic community and, as such, cannot comprehend those global processes and relations that are decisive in the long run for the political development of the society examined. They must confess that theirs is perhaps a study of an "epiphenomenal" domestic political culture—a kind of dependent "superstructure" residing atop, and determined by, a social and economic "base" whose international compass exceeds the national reach of critical inquiry.

On the part of critical analysts of capitalist society, one possible response to the problem is to ignore or deny the international relationships bearing upon domestic political development and change. One might proceed as if the domestic order of advanced capitalist society were a self-contained system. Another response—more sensible than the first—is to try to overturn the proposition that would impose a national limit upon critical inquiry: the realist proposition that international politics is a sphere beyond community. If this realist proposition can be toppled, if it can be shown that the "anarchy" so evident in international politics is not inimical to the critical analyst's presupposition of community, then the sphere of international politics is not necessarily beyond the reach of critical inquiry. In principle, the scope of critical political inquiry could be made coextensive with the...
international compass of social and economic processes bearing upon important political outcomes.

I want to pursue this latter line of response. In a sketchy and provisional fashion, I want to begin to explore the question of a modern international political community from the point of view of critical inquiry. What, I shall ask, is the appropriate focal point of inquiry? Where are we to find, and how are we to understand, "community" in international political life?

As will become plain soon enough, my answer is not to point to one of those traditions of international political thought and practice that have conspicuously celebrated global community or the unity of humankind. To use Martin Wight’s colorful phrasing (Bull, 1976: 104–5), international community is not to be located in the rationalist discourse of the "subversion and liberation and missionary men,” the revolutionary utopian discourse of a rational “community of man” developed in the spirit of Immanuel Kant. Nor is its natural site in the discourse of “the law and order and keep your word men,” the discourse of international legal interpretation in the communitarian spirit of Hugo Grotius.

Rather, as signalled by the title to this article, I shall suggest that modern international political community finds its primary focus with a most unlikely tradition, the very tradition that has proudly said nay to international political community at every turn. It resides with the discourse of political realism, “the blood and iron and immorality men,” the thinkers often associated with the spirit of Machiavelli (Bull, 1976: 104). International political community, I shall say, is not hidden away in some deep structure, customary rules, immanent revolutionary imperatives, or murky truth behind and unifying a fragmented political experience. It is right there on the surface, in the regularized practices, techniques, and rituals of realist power politics.

Before turning to the discourse of realist power politics and its rituals, though, there is a prior task to be performed. I need to be a good deal more definite about the critical attitude within which the question of international political community is posed. What is the standpoint and posture appropriate to critical inquiry in international politics? From this standpoint, just what form of "community" are we predisposed to find?

The questions are crucial. For it will soon become clear that a critical inquiry into international politics is not entering a conceptual vacuum. It must contend with a reigning attitude, a reigning set of interpretive dispositions regarding the question of community in international affairs. It must contend, more specifically, with a widely-shared readiness to interpret community ahistorically and monistically as a fixed thematic unity, a kind of essence, an identity transcending and uniting manifest differences in the world of human practice. Such interpretive dispositions, we shall note, put community in opposition to pluralism, each negating the other. Such interpretive dispositions, we shall also note, can be readily associated with Western rationalist discourse. They are dispositions that realism, involved in that discourse, shares. They are in fact the interpretive dispositions upon which realists rely when they insist that political community exists only at the level of national society, that there is no political community in the pluralistic world of power politics.
If this were the only possible understanding of community, then the critical analyst could not reasonably object to the realist’s denial of international community. Nor would the critical analyst want to object to a conception of global society that is pluralistic rather than communitarian in this restrictive rationalist sense. The rationalist interpretation of community is not, however, the only possible interpretation that a critical analyst might entertain. Although this ahistorical and monistic understanding of community is the interpretation upon which discussion of international community has most typically pivoted, it is just this understanding from which critical analysis must take its distance. What critical analysis needs, I want to suggest, is an attitude toward community, a view from afar, very much in keeping with the “geopolitical” outlook present in Michel Foucault’s (1977, 1979a, 1980) genealogical method. What one needs, put differently, is a geopolitical perspective on the field of geopolitics.

II. A critical attitude and the study of international politics
The critical attitude I want to introduce can best be initially understood in terms of what it is not, and what it is decidedly not is an exercise in the discovery or recovery of an identity, an origin, or a deep essence behind and ordering the manifest differences on the surface of human experience. Indeed, this critical attitude specifically refuses the dichotomies of identity and difference, depth and surface upon which so much of Western political discourse turns. The refusal implies the distancing of critical inquiry from three familiar approaches to analysis.

Critical inquiry must be distanced, first of all, from the “hermeneutics of everydayness” (see Heidegger, 1962: 76–8; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: xvii). The task of critical inquiry is misconstrued if it is grasped as an attempt to arrive at a “primordial understanding,” a relation of familiarity with familiar experience of those who regularly participate in the “everyday life” of an “international community”—diplomats, soldiers, international civil servants, trade officials, journalists, and so on. The critical analyst’s pose vis-à-vis international politics is not, for example, that of an ethnomethodologist studying a “primitive” culture.

Critical inquiry must be distanced, secondly, from what Paul Ricoeur (1979) calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” the recovery of an underlying truth that is masked by everyday understandings. The task of international critical inquiry is misconstrued if it is regarded as an attempt to penetrate superficial and distorted understandings of a manifestly fragmented, conflictful, and violent international sphere, thus to disclose some essential unity, some ordering principles, some firm foundations secreted in repressed or forgotten depths. The critical analyst’s attitude toward international politics cannot be likened to that of, say, Sigmund Freud recovering a repressed unconscious. Similarly, it cannot be likened to Karl Marx attempting to penetrate bourgeois illusions, decipher this reigning consciousness, recover an awareness of class struggle, and thereby liberate praxis from the snare of false consciousness.

Thirdly, critical inquiry must keep its distance from the “anti-hermeneutic
The task of international critical inquiry is misconstrued if it is regarded as an attempt to come to grips with the natural structures, the covering laws, or the genetic code existing prior to and independent of the international political practices they generate or represent. The critical analyst of international politics cannot be likened to, say, the Saussurian positivist seeking out the language prior to speech or to the behavioralist trying to lay bare the lawlike regularities governing tendencies to comply with or resist authority.

None of these three approaches supplies an adequate metaphor for the task of critical inquiry in international politics. None is adequate because all implicitly accept the absolute dichotomies of identity and difference, depth and surface. All reduce critical inquiry to the search for a fixed, final, and singular unity of meaning, an identity, transcending and unifying spatial and temporal differences—as if all history were authored by a single voice occupying a uniquely valid vantage point. All anticipate analysis coming to a close with the discovery of this “univocal” understanding, much as metaphysics would come to rest with the discovery of the “miraculous origin” (Wunderursprung). All thereby earn the critical analyst’s distrust.

Distrust is due because there can be no guarantees that the hidden “identities” these approaches would recover are the autonomous, extrahistorical, and universal truths they are purported to be. Likely as not, they are themselves arbitrary interpretations imposed historically in the ordering of social life. Likely as not, in other words, they are themselves imposed modes of order, modes of domination. To bring analysis to a contented end with the recovery of a hidden identity is therefore not the liberative enterprise it is so often proclaimed to be. Quite the contrary, it risks participation in the normalization and secreting of modes of political domination.

The appropriate approach to critical inquiry in international politics is thus one that would refuse the dichotomies of identity and difference, surface and depth. It would not pretend to an “apocalyptic objectivity,” a totalizing standpoint outside of time and capable of enclosing all history within a singular narrative, a law of development, or a vision of progress toward a certain end of humankind. Eschewing any claim to secure grounds, the appropriate posture would aspire instead to an overview of international history in the making, a view from afar, from up high. The appropriate posture is disposed to a view very much akin to that of Michel Foucault’s genealogical attitude: “a form of history which accounts for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to refer to a subject, whether it be transcendental in relation to the field of events or whether it chase its empty identity throughout history” (1979b: 35).

From a distant genealogical standpoint, what catches the eye is motion, discontinuities, clashes, and the ceaseless play of plural forces and plural interpretations on the surface of human experience. Nothing is finally stable. There are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history. Seen from afar, there is only interpretation, and interpretation itself is comprehended as a practice of domination occurring on the surface of history (Foucault, 1977: 150). History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretations—
none primary, all arbitrary. To paraphrase Foucault, a genealogical standpoint permits history to be glimpsed in terms of the violent and surreptitious appropriation of consensual understandings, which themselves have no essential meaning, in order to impose direction, to bend them to a new will, to force their participation in different games, and to subject them to secondary interpretations (1977: 151–2). At least five overlapping aspects of this genealogical attitude merit notice here.

First, adopting a genealogical attitude involves a radical shift in one's analytic focus. It involves a shift away from an interest in uncovering the structures of history and toward an interest in understanding the movement and clashes of historical practices that would impose or resist structure. With this shift, the *opera operata* of political life recede into the background as the eye is drawn to the ceaseless movement and interplay of *modi operandi*. With this shift, put differently, social inquiry is increasingly disposed to find its focus in the posing of "how" questions, not "what" questions. How, by way of what practices, are structures of history produced, differentiated, reified, and transformed? How, by way of what strategies, displacements, and shifting emphases, are fields of practice pried open, bounded, and secured? How, by way of what maneuvers and in opposition to what resistances, are regions of silence established?

Second, having refused any notion of universal truths or deep identities transcending differences, a genealogical attitude is disposed to comprehend all history, including the production of order, in terms of the endless power political clash of multiple wills. As Foucault has put it, "only a single drama is ever staged in this nonplace, the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (1977: 150). Practices therefore cannot be fully comprehended in terms of their more or less adequate fulfillment of pregiven interpretations. Rather, practices, like the interpretations they honor and project, are to be understood to contain their own strategies, their own political technologies, their own "meticulous rituals of power" (Foucault, 1977, 1979b). They are to be understood as containing their own exemplary and replicable strategies and technologies for the disciplining of plural historical practices in the production of historical modes of domination.

Third, a genealogical attitude disposes one to be especially attentive to the historical emergence, bounding, conquest, and administration of social *spaces*. It is interested, that is, in the emergence and disciplining of *fields of practice* that are normally understood in terms of more or less autonomous narratives, conceptual frameworks, or interpretive schemes. One might think, for example, of divisions of territory and population among nation states, each asserting the right to a partially unique interpretation of the whole and each making good on that claim within some spatial, demographic, and temporal compass. One might also think of the separation of spheres of politics and economics, the distinction between high and low politics, the differentiation of public and private spaces, the line of demarcation between domestic and international, the disciplinary division between science and philosophy, the boundary between the social and the natural, or the separation of the normal and legitimate from the abnormal and criminal.

Refusing essentialist conceits, a genealogical posture cannot approach a
field of practice as if it were governed by a univocal narrative or organized around a single theme or concept. Nor can it approach a field of practice as if the boundaries separating it from other fields were fixed and unproblematic. Instead, a genealogical posture entails a readiness to approach a field of practice historically, as an historically emergent and always contested product of multiple practices, multiple alien interpretations which struggle, clash, deconstruct, and displace one another. As such, a field of practice—be it the field of economics, say, or the field of domestic politics in the United States—is seen as "a field of clashes," a battlefield. It is seen as an historically fabricated network of multiple themes, concepts, narratives, and practices that can be ordered, recombined, dispersed, and relatively stressed in different ways.

From a genealogical standpoint, to be sure, one cannot fail to note that in practice there are many fields that do seem to exist as autonomous unities. One cannot fail to notice that, for example, nation states and academic disciplines are very often characterized by identifying and unifying themes and concepts, and very often do seem to exhibit rather clear lines of demarcation separating them from other states or disciplines. Given a genealogical attitude, however, such observations are not mistaken for the discovery of some fixed identity. Instead, a genealogical attitude disposes one to regard the "autonomy" and "identity" of a field as a consequence of the play of power among plural elements. One is disposed to look for the strategies, techniques, and rituals of power by which multiple themes, concepts, narratives, and practices are excluded, silenced, dispersed, recombined, or given new or reversed emphases, thereby to privilege some elements over others, impose boundaries, and discipline practice in a manner producing just this normalized division of practical space.

Fourth, what goes for the production and disciplining of social spaces goes also for the production and disciplining of subjects. From a genealogical standpoint, there are no subjects, no fully formed identical egos, having an existence prior to practice and then implicated in power political struggles. Like fields of practice, subjects emerge in history. The "possessive individual," the "pious Christian," the "yuppie consumer," the "feminist father," the "bold and decisive President," and all other modes of subjectivity emerge on the plane of historical practice, and they emerge in consequence of the power political struggle among concepts, themes, and modes of practice. As such, the subject is itself a site of power political contest, and ceaselessly so. The subject itself exists as an identifiable subject only in the precarious balancing and dispersal of plural interpretive elements resulting from the continuing strategic interplay of multiple alien forms.

Fifth, a genealogical posture does sustain an interest in those noble enterprises—such as philosophy, religion, positive social science, or the utopian political crusade—that would embark on searches for the hidden essences, the universal truths, the profound insights into the secret identity that transcends difference, the synchrony that governs history's diachrony, the perfect order, or the moral imperatives that women and men are obliged to honor. From a genealogical standpoint, however, such noble enterprises are not regarded as the serious identity-seeking excavations they present...
themselves to be. They are instead resituated right on the surface of political
life. They are seen as political practice intimately engaged in the
interpretation, production, and normalization of modes of imposed order,
modes of domination. They are seen as means by which practice is disciplined
and domination advances in history.

Considered all at once, these five aspects suggest some noteworthy
similarities between a genealogical attitude and the outlook of geopolitics
familiar to students of international relations. Like geopolitics, a genealogical
attitude is preoccupied with motion, space, strategy, and power. Like
geopolitics, also, a genealogical attitude is distrustful of all approaches that
would accord to moral claims, traditional institutions, or deep interpretations
the status of a fixed and homogeneous essence, a final truth, an underlying
law, a relentless continuity, or an ultimate origin of international political life.
As applied to the question of international community, this "geopolitical"
attitude has definite implications. From a genealogical standpoint, interna-
tional community can only be seen as a never completed product of multiple
historical practices, a still-contested product of struggle to impose
interpretation upon interpretation. In its form, it can only be understood as a
network of historically fabricated practical understandings, precedents, skills,
and procedures that define competent international subjectivity and that
occupy a precariously held social space pried open amidst contending
historical forces, multiple interpretations, and plural practices.

Accordingly, the analyst approaching international community from a
genealogical point of view must see it from four aspects at the same time. The
analyst must approach it as (a) an object, a site, and product of ceaseless
struggles, conquests, and displacements among plural historical forces; (b) a
place in which power and domination are secreted in normalized form; (c) a
field of practice upon which specific subjects emerge, secure recognition, and
act; and (d) a set of meticulous techniques, strategies, and rituals by which
practices are disciplined, resistances are tamed, regions of silence are
imposed, boundaries of practice are secured, subjects are legitimated, order is
normalized, and domination is violently projected in the world. An
international community's consensually held codes, rules, precedents, and
procedures are not, from this standpoint, final limits on violence and
domination. Viewed from afar, they are seen to be objects of power politics
and modalities by which violence is done and domination advanced.

Presented in this way, genealogy's "geopolitical" approach to the critical
analysis of international politics is likely to invite objection. Objection is
perhaps likely to be most immediate and fierce on the part of the political
realist tradition, the discourse that has long claimed geopolitics as its own
special theme. Political realists are likely to object that the critical
attitude—the genealogical attitude with its geopolitical overtones—is simply
out of place as applied to international politics. It is not so much that
genealogy's geopolitical posture is mistaken, realists might say. It is that a
genealogical posture cannot be a critical attitude as it applies to the
international sphere.

The objection can be elaborated with reference to a dichotomy habitually
invoked by realist thinkers: the dichotomy of domestic and international
politics. The sphere of domestic politics, according to this distinction, is the sphere in which community is most fully realized. It is the domain wherein the intersubjective foundations of action lend authority to the state as the monopolist of coercive means, the primary arbiter of social conflicts, and the ultimate agent of rational action on behalf of society as a whole. Martin Wight, for instance, sees the domestic politics of modern liberal societies as the realm of "the good life," a sphere wherein it is possible to speak of absolute ends, a sphere "susceptible of progressivist interpretation" (Wight, 1966: 26, 33). It is the natural home of modernist narrative—the multifaceted historical narrative rooted in the Enlightenment, dominant in Western society, expressed in rationalist theory, and centering on the progressive unfolding of universalizing reason and social harmony via science, technology, law, and the state.

The sphere of international politics, according to the same realist distinction, is said to be a realm dominated by anarchy, not community. It is described as a pluralistic sphere of multiple independent vantage points, each with its own independent voice, each having its own sense of a whole, and each ready to check or resist others' attempts to impose an encompassing rationalist model of the whole. International politics is thus, in Wight's words, "the realm of recurrence and repetition; it is a field in which political action is most regularly necessitous" (Wight, 1966: 27). Here, according to this distinction, the modernist narrative cannot hold, and the Western conceit of the progressive march toward absolute ends gives way to the repetitious competition for relative means.

Invoking this domestic-international dichotomy, some realists might find something of value in the proposed critical attitude as applied to the study of domestic politics. Here, some might concede, is a sphere of political life that has evolved a mode of community, a modern liberal community, which normalizes its "progressivist" war against "tradition" and thereby obscures its own significance as a medium and means of political power. Thus, with a little prodding, some realists might allow that there are things to learn from the "postmodernist" analyses of the strategies of domination and mechanisms of power inscribed in modernist narratives of domestic political life. Such analyses, they might say, provide a welcome antidote to a positive political science whose superficial empiricist "pluralism" at once conceals and projects a commitment to the progressive unfolding of a single rational truth.

With respect to international politics, however, the same realists are likely to object that the proposed critical attitude is, so to speak, yesterday's news. In the study of international politics, there is nothing especially novel about themes of power, domination, conflict, violence, clashes of plural forces, and the conquest and holding of political space. There is, similarly, no need to be reminded to look for the unabated play of power hiding in high-sounding claims as to the existence of universal scientific truths, transcendent moral principles, essential meanings, or immanent communities of humankind. These are themes of which practiced statesmen are all too aware. These are themes that political realists have long made their own. Recalling these themes is quite unnecessary in an arena where one can still hear echoes of "manifest destiny," "Lebensraum," "white man's burden," "Pax Britann-
ca, "Pax Americana," and recurring pronouncements such as the following by Goebbels. "We shall conquer," Goebbels pronounced, "because it lies in the logic of history, because a higher destiny wills it, . . . because without our victory history would have lost its meaning; and history is not meaningless" (Goebbels, 1943, quoted in Wight, 1966: 29).

The objection, in short, is that there is nothing to be gained from bringing trendy Parisian readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger to the scene of international politics. Here theorists and practitioners long ago discovered the void of community at the heart of global political life. Here, realists would add, geopolitics is not a figure of speech; it is to be found in its natural site, as a modality of political action and as a literal fact of life. And here there is already a well-established tradition of analysis and practice, the tradition of political realism itself, whose grasp of the primordial emptiness of international politics has allowed it to see the power political significance of communitarian conceits in a pluralistic world. One would not carry coals to Newcastle, pitch refrigerators to Eskimos, or urge sanctimony upon the Pope. One need not promote a critical attitude in the study of international politics.

This objection cannot go unanswered. It is, after all, but a revised version of the problem stated at the outset of this article. In the next section, I want to respond at length to this objection. As will be seen, this response is itself an example of a genealogical approach. As will also be seen, this response begins to afford an answer to this article’s central query: where is critical analysis to find, and how is it to interpret, "community" in international political life? The answer, as we shall see, is with realist power politics itself.

III. Realism and the community of power politics

A response to the realist objection might begin with an observation. From a genealogical standpoint, one can observe that the realist objection, including its vaunted domestic–international dichotomy, relies upon a double move, a two-sided rhetorical maneuver. The first realist move, one can say, involves a metaphorical reduction: the question of community in international politics is framed entirely by the predominant understanding of community at work in domestic society, the reigning understanding of community in Western rationalist discourse. The second move involves a strategic deferment: whereas domestic society can be described in terms of the compass of community’s presence, the space of international politics is marked off as the sphere wherein the realization of community must still be deferred. Before offering an answer to the realist objection, let us spend a few moments considering this double move and its practical political significance.

A. The double move of realist discourse

The first move, the metaphorical reduction of "community," involves the wholesale embrace of the understanding of community predominant in Western rationalist discourse, at least since Plato. Consistent with this understanding; community appears in realist argument as a timeless and universal identity. It appears primarily as an autonomous and original social
presence, a totality arching a differentiated political experience and giving direction and meaning to all social and political change. Where community reigns, therefore, all practice and all history is thought to resolve itself into a single thematic unity.

It is clear that such an understanding of community allows no room for irresolvable discontinuity, disparity, incommensurability, contingency, violence, and power politics. For the realist, as for the rationalist, these cannot be said to occur within community. All are understood to occur at—in fact, they define—the interstices, the margins, the momentary outer ambit of community.

Just as clearly, the rationalist understanding of community as a universal and transhistorical identity precludes any recognition of final limits. Community must relate to discontinuities, contingency, and power politics, not as demarcations of its own fixed limits, but as the transient frontiers of its progress toward the realization of its universal identity. In keeping with the modernist narrative mentioned earlier, community must relate to discontinuities as the momentary margins of its own endlessly expanding range of rational mastery. A limit always exists, in other words, as something about to be pierced, penetrated, and transgressed, thus to subordinate the recalcitrant world beyond. The historical ambit of a community is the site of its ambition.

For the realist, the domestic order of modern liberal society is the sphere wherein the singularity, constancy, and continuity of community are most fully formed. Within the sovereign span of the state, the modernist narrative is thought to be historically effective. The singularity of community is here understood to predominate over the pluralistic play of power. Thanks to this, realists suggest, social ruptures, discontinuities, violence, and power politics—although they may occur—are not predominant features of domestic politics. The control of coercive means can find its focus in a single authoritative center, the state, which owes its legitimacy to its roots in community and which deploys its means to enforce compliance with the thematic unity that is domestic community.

The second realist move finds its footing in a historicist consciousness that complements the abstract rationalist principles implicit in the first move. While realists thoroughly embrace the Western rationalist understanding of domestic community, they are also sensitive to its blindness with respect to history. While they share a commitment to the progressive realization of the abstract and universal values already flowering in domestic community, they also sense that this project, thanks to its rationalism, is blind to its own situation amidst the hazardous movement and potential resistances of an open-ended and decentered history.

In the second move, therefore, realists strive to overcome this blindness by pointing up the historical margins of community, the margins that separate domestic political community from the resistant world beyond its sway. These margins define a spatial relation, a difference between domestic and international politics, but the move that constitutes these margins is also a temporal relation, a deferment of domestic community’s essential project for a universal and timeless rational unity. As realists insist, the span of domestic community always has its historical margins, no matter how universal its
aspirations, and beyond these margins lies a world where the progressive realization of community must still be deferred.

Realists thus present international politics as "the untidy fringe of domestic politics" (Wight, 1966: 21). They present it as the space beyond the margins of community. Here, realists say, the community–power politics relation of domestic society is radically reversed. Relations bearing the mark of community—moral norms, economic regimes, or legal principles, for example—remain the hostage of power politics. Here, accordingly, history remains recalcitrant and polyvocal. History will not yet bend to the thematic unity of domestic political life. It will not yet yield to the universal and timeless structuring principles, political theories, legal systems, or moral norms of domestic order. It will instead display social cleavages, violence, and power politics on the very surface of practice.

This second move, with its historicist cast, is for realists a longstanding habit. It finds one of its principal exemplars in Renaissance Florence—most notably, the labors of Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Savanarola. Machiavelli and his near-contemporaries worked to develop a civic humanist theory and practice of rule adapted to the demands of an emergently robust, urban-centered commercial class under conditions of disintegrating papal authority and mounting threats from beyond the peninsula. Confronting these conditions, they also worked within and against a medieval epistemic framework that assumed a principle of divine creation and a universal natural harmony uniquely interpretable from the singular, extra-historical standpoint of the Church’s nunc-stans. Finding resources in the likes of Livy, Aristotle, and Xenophon, Machiavelli in particular set out to distinguish between the virtue of the prince and the virtue of the citizen. He set out to distinguish the prince’s raison d’état, with its understanding of necessary competition over relative means amidst the fortunes of historical time and space, from the citizen’s ethics, with their focus upon absolute, timeless, and universal ends. In so doing, Machiavelli established the paradigm of realism’s historicist consciousness: an awareness of the secular creativity of human history, a respect for human power over the human future, a demand for human responsibility, and a refusal to subordinate political practice to the proclaimed singularity and timelessness of an eschatological vision (see Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 1978).

1. The double move in realist ritual. This realist double move, as Friedrich Meinecke (1957) would have reminded us, is not a one-time, once and for all maneuver. It cannot be. For to understand the move is to see that it involves the simultaneous embracing and practical limiting of Western understandings of community—rationalist understandings that will respect no practical limits. The first move invokes an unsurpassed commitment to a Western order of discourse, which is disposed to regard all limits only as abstract objects of its own essential project for a universal rational mastery. The second move defers the universal fulfillment of this commitment by invoking history. It invokes a commitment to the historical and particularistic view—so contrary to the abstract universalism of Western rationalist thought—that the margins of community are real, always present, and
always of profound practical significance. The opposed commitments are one in realism. Together, they establish a tension that is a crucial part of the realists' habitual posture toward the world. Indeed, the performance of the double move that gives rise to this tension is the stuff of familiar realist rituals.

The double move is perhaps most conspicuously ritualized in realists' rehearsals of the time-honored critiques of "idealism," "utopianism," "liberalism," "rationalism," and "scientism" in international affairs. It can be readily detected, for example, in the following snippets of argument from realist E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*:

There is no escape from the fundamental dilemma that every community, and every code of morality, postulates some recognition that the good of the part may have to be sacrificed to the good of the whole. . . . In the national community, appeals to self-sacrifice are constantly and successfully made, even when the sacrifice asked for is the sacrifice of life. But even in the national community, it would be erroneous to support that the so-called "harmony" is established solely through voluntary self-sacrifice. The sacrifice required is frequently a forced one, and the "harmony" is based on the realistic consideration that it is in the "interest" of the individual to sacrifice voluntarily what would otherwise be taken from him by force. Harmony in the national order is achieved by this blend of morality and power.

In the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less. . . . When self-sacrifice is attributed to a state, the chances are greater that this alleged self-sacrifice will turn out on inspection to be a forced submission to a stronger power. . . . Any international order must rest on some hegemony of power (Carr, 1964: 167–8).

The same double move reappears in Martin Wight's views of the international system:

Anarchy is the characteristic that distinguishes international politics from ordinary politics. The study of international politics presupposes the absence of a system of government, as the study of domestic politics presupposes the existence of one. Qualifications are necessary: there is a system of international law and there are international institutions to modify or complicate the workings of power politics. But it is roughly the case that, while in domestic politics the struggle for power is governed and circumscribed by the framework of law and institutions, in international politics law and institutions are governed and circumscribed by the struggle for power. This indeed is the justification for calling international politics "power politics" *par excellence* (Wight, 1978: 102).

The double move figures strategically yet again in John Herz's contrasting of *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, in Reinhold Niebuhr's dichotomy of *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, and in Hans Morgenthau's antinomy of *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (Herz, 1951; Morgenthau, 1946;
Niebuhr, 1944). Herz's political idealists, Niebuhr's children of light, and Morgenthau's scientific man are all portrayed as communitarians in the reigning Western rationalist sense of community. All are presented as viewing politics through the lens of community—community as a foundational and universal identity having priority over power in political life. All, therefore, need to be reminded that although such a view aspires to all that is noble, meaningful, and good in Western man, Western man must take care to observe the real historical limits of community. Beyond these margins lurks the domain of political realism, of the children of darkness, and of power politics. The height of folly, the source of much danger, and the depth of tragedy, realist critics teach, inheres in the neglecting or overreaching of these limits.

The ritual play of this double move is not confined to recurring renditions of these venerable critiques, however. It is replicated in all aspects of realist discourse. For example:

- It appears in realists' recurring narrative accounts of instances of heroic conservative statesmanship: stories wherein heroes such as Metternich serve the mission of civilizing progress precisely by comprehending the practical and historical limits of that mission, by deferring the penetration and transgression of the recognized limits of rational progress, and by sustaining a readiness for the prudent use of political power beyond the limit (e.g., with respect to the question of German nationalism).
- It supplies the basic story line of realist tragedians: stories of the society (be it Thucydides' Athens or George Kennan's United States) whose "moral hubris" or "sin of pride" infects its statesmanship and, in turn, causes the failure of diplomacy, the reduction of effective power, and perhaps the onset of ruinous war.
- It provides a crucial theme in realist warnings regarding reliance on international institutions of collective security, such as the United Nations or the League of Nations: these institutions can be deprecated insofar as they are attempts "to apply principles of Lockean liberalism to the building of a machinery of international order."
- It is at work in realists' expressions of dismay regarding the foreign policy practices of recent political leaders: scorn is heaped upon the Carter–Brzezinski human rights doctrine, for instance, for its oscillations between suburban moralistic sermons (when directed toward the Third World) and the parading of universalistic anti-communist ideals (when directed toward Eastern Europe).
- It is central to realists' typical diagnoses of the current "crisis of world politics:" the crisis finds its causes, say these diagnoses, in a number of structural developments in modern liberal community that tend to impede or deny the ability of statesmen to defer or displace the immediate projection into international politics of the liberal and rationalist expectations evolving this side of the limit.
- It makes its presence felt in some realists' hopeful anticipations of the eventual emergence of a world community and a world state: here and now, say these anticipations, international politics remains an anarchic field of
power politics, but the universal values of community might in the long-run carry the day if prudently pursued by historically sensitive statesmen.

2. Rituals of power and the constitution of international political community. It is important, then, to understand the status of this double move as a ritual of realist discourse, a ritual inscribed in realist habit and yet highly mobile in its application. From a genealogical standpoint, it is even more important to understand that the realist double move is a ritual of power, a habitually wielded procedure of rule. It is a political maneuver—itself a kind of power politics—whose replication in diverse settings has definite historical consequences, definite effects upon the historical division and administration of practical space. To simplify, we may say that this double move has a double effect.

The first effect is that the double move constitutes the space and subjectivity of a relatively autonomous field of international political practice—an international community in the genealogical sense discussed earlier. As a field of practice differentiated from domestic practice, this international political community is not a fixed and determinately bounded essence of international politics. It is instead a historically emergent field of practice pried open and sustained, if at all, by dint of the hazardous interplay of techniques and rituals of power, including the double move's simultaneous embrace and practical limiting of the Western rationalist commitments historically attached to the sovereign state.

This international community's subjects are statesmen, for the double move contains a commitment to Western rationalism, and it is the modern state that historically effects the claim that it is the consummation of reason, the true subject of rational community. But the competent statesmen of this international community are not pregiven rational egos whose practices are merely the rational projections of the universalizing concepts, narratives, and themes at work in their respective national communities. The international political community's competent subjects are realists. Their subjectivity is the subjectivity of realism. Thus, the competent subjects of international political community are those statesmen who not only share an abiding commitment to the Western rationalist tradition embodied in the national community but also know themselves and define their interests in terms of their locus at the historical margins of rationalist order.

Situated at the margins, competent statesmen are disposed to sustain an awareness of the domestic community's historicity, practical limits, external threats, and internally generated dangers. Looking outward beyond the margins, the competent statesman is ever poised to defend the domestic community as a field of reason, enlightenment, and progress; he is poised to defend it against the violent reassertion of dark and regressive modes of rule that would impose the singularity and timelessness of an eschatological vision—classically, either in the form of an Augustinian civitas Dei or in the form of antichurch apocalyptic—upon the plurality and open-endedness of secular and temporal existence. Looking inward, the competent statesman is jealously on guard against the anti-historical universalism present in domestic society's rationalist commitments; he is ever poised to check or deflect the
tendencies to transfer rational order's images, metaphors, and practices beyond the margins, beyond the span of their power, beyond the space where they can be made historically effective.

As a participant in an international political community, the competent statesman is disposed to look to other statesmen as well, and in them he is disposed to find the replication of his own poignant marginality. His every practice—his every ritual of power—is disposed to the reproduction of this international community's space and, with it, the space and power of his own and others' mode of subjectivity. Himself a product of these rituals, the competent statesman is habitually disposed to resist those pressures, from whatever national locus they might spring, that would diminish the space of international community and reduce statesmanship to a mere projection of domestic society's rationalist demands. Herein is the statesman's interest—his "interest defined as power" (Morgenthau, 1978).

The second effect of the realist double move complements the first. The double move is, as noted, a historical practice whose first effect is to clear the space of an international political community and constitute a subjectivity of realist statesmanship within it. The double move's second effect is to administer a silence regarding the historicity of the boundaries it produces, the space it historically clears, and the subjects it historically constitutes. By reducing the question of community to a Western rationalist understanding, and by deferring the universalization of community so understood, the double move performs a reversal to end all reversals. It invokes a Western rationalist understanding of a domestic community-as-preservation in order to differentiate a field of international political practice recognized as a primordial absence-of-community.

So recognized, international community is misrecognized at the same time. Domestic society, comprehended as the presence of community, can only be grasped as an opus operatum, a kind of natural harmony born of a self-originating grace. Understood as a void of community, international politics likewise takes on the cast of a natural realm, a fait accompli, the necessary residua of the mysteries out of which domestic society took form. It appears as a realm of necessity existing independent of knowledge, will, and practice. Thanks to a "genesis amnesia" effected by the recurring play of the double move, the realm of international politics cannot be recognized for what it is: a historically effected mode of political community vying with other modes and owing its precarious existence to historical practices and the strategic play of power, including the double move itself. On this silence reigns.

It is not difficult to see how this second effect, the effect of silence, complements the first. By imposing a silence—by occulting the community of international politics, misrecognizing it as a natural sphere—the double move excludes from active political discourse the strategies and procedures by which the margins of domestic and international society are produced, the sphere of international politics is constituted and normalized, and the prevailing subjectivity of modern statesmanship is empowered. Excluded from discourse, these strategies are exempted from criticism, and they are situated out of sight of active resistance. They are appreciated, if at all, not as rituals of power participating in the production of order but as necessary responses to a truth already given.
Together, the two effects of the realist double move set up an irony of no small proportions. They constitute a community whose members will know their place only as an absence of community. More than that, they constitute a field of self-consciously “power political” practice that refuses to entertain the question of its own power. They constitute a field of power politics that cannot and will not speak of its own dependence upon the competent waging of an unending historical struggle to delimit the reach of rational order, pry open its own practical space, and secure recognition for its own distinctive mode of subjectivity.

B. Responding to the realist objection: the community of power politics

Noting this, we can return at last to the realist objection to a genealogical approach to international political analysis. The objection, we recall, deploys a Western rationalist understanding of community in order to say that community finds its essential focus in the modern state, that the sphere of international politics lacks community, that the sphere is a natural order beyond the margins of modern community’s sway, and that just here, in the abyss of international politics, geopolitical struggle is witnessed in its primeval site and its most elemental form. The key actors of this space, the realist continues, are not constituted by an international community. The key actors are instead wise and rational statesmen—modern men who are possessed of the realist’s own courage, who dare to find their station at the margins of rational domestic order, and who look unflinchingly into the profound chasm of international politics. The realist thus insists that international politics is a space in which a genealogical approach, for all its pretenses to criticism consciousness, could at best disclose what the wise statesman already takes as an article of faith in his daily practice: that every practice, including the search for international community, is always to be comprehended as part of the unceasing struggle for power among states.

From a genealogical standpoint, this realist objection cannot be ignored, but neither can it be regarded as the detached, profound, and strictly theoretical appraisal realists might believe it to be. On the contrary, to examine the objection is to see at once that it is as much an instance of political practice as it is an instance of theory. It is a performance of a ritual, a ritual of power. It is one more rendition, in a specific context, of the double move we have been discussing.

Seen from a genealogical distance, the realist discovery of the profound emptiness of international politics is not, as realists would have it, a penetration of the dark depths of international life, the depths from which liberals and rationalists recoil. It is instead a ritual performance of the double move occurring on the surface of global life and having a geopolitical significance. It is a ritual performance that would secure the space of international community, naturalize that community, and empower a specific subjectivity, the subjectivity of the modern statesman. It is a ritual performance that would also effect a silence on genealogy’s own more far-reaching geopolitics of global time and space, reducing geopolitical understandings to those limited forms that can find expression by way of the
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modern state. In so doing, this ritual would render silent the genealogical proposition that political realism is itself the voice of a specific historical mode of international community—a problematic mode of international community that has sustained a tentative hold on international political space. It would exclude the proposition that realism, in all its rituals, is at the same time the prevailing subjectivity of this community and an instrument of its power.

We have, then, our answer to the realist objection. The objection, like realism itself, forgets the power politics of power politics, the geopolitics of geopolitical space. Despite its pose of a daring willingness to stare into the teeth of power beyond community’s limits, realism actively forgets some of the most important aspects of power politics. The critical analyst therefore cannot be satisfied to adopt realism’s own perspective. The analyst needs to pursue a genealogical approach.

This, however, is not to say that the critical analyst should neglect realist argument and practice, excluding it from the ambit of critical inquiry. Quite the contrary. Realism must occupy a very important place in any attempt to answer our initial query: Where is the critical analyst to find and how is the analyst to understand “community” in international political life? What, put differently, is the appropriate focal point of critical inquiry in international politics?

The answer, we can now say, is this: modern international political community is not an immanent unity of humankind, and it is not a repressed or forgotten deep structure. The dominant mode of international political community is already present right on the surface of international politics. It is present in the dispositions, techniques, skills, and rituals of realist power politics. It is present, in other words, on the surface of a transnational discourse of power politics whose every breath denies the positivity of international community as such. That we do not or cannot recognize it as international community is not proof of international community’s absence. It is a testament to the power of a realist community of statesmanship.

The discourse of realism, which is rooted in the contesting strains of European experience, provides the language, the practical precedents, and the durable strategies and techniques of modern international political society, the public sphere of modern global life. It is constitutive of modern international politics as a relatively autonomous sphere, a space and a community of international life differentiated practically from domestic society. The scholars who proclaim themselves realists are among the primary bearers and interpreters of this discourse and the community it constitutes. Their narratives are renditions of the master narrative of modern international political life. Their interpretations are the interpretations embodied in the everyday practices of competent statesmen as they strive to understand and cope with their circumstances on an international plane. The anarchic struggles of which realists speak, far from negating international community, play out the active principles and modes of discipline at work in a Europe-born global order. The sovereign state boundaries that realists honor, far from demarcating the limits of community, are plastic divisions of political space worked out within a community having a transnational reach. If one is
to come to grips with international politics as a community, one would do well to make realist practices of statecraft one's point of departure.

IV. Concluding comments: a challenge for critical inquiry

Political realism may be a worthy point of departure for the critical analysis of international politics, but it must not be mistaken for an end. Although realism's champions certainly have a political interest in dressing up their claims as timeless truths, their discourse cannot be reduced to a compendium of eternal verities. Although much sound and fury surrounds assertions to the effect that this or that argument captures the deeply secreted content of realist thought, the truth of the matter is that political realism has no fundamental and unchanging identity, no autonomous and original essence (see Ashley, 1984; Walker, 1987).

From a genealogical standpoint, realism is a name for a discourse of power and rule in modern global life. This discourse is generated historically, through the practical fusion of alien elements. There is, as one element emphasized here, the commitment to Western rationalist understandings of community. There is also, as a second element I have stressed, the commitment to history, which is cast up as a zone beyond and limiting the ambit of modern domestic order. Realist discourse maintains its space, its practical significance, its relative autonomy, and its power, not intrinsically, but only so long as the practices of historical subjects preserve these and other alien elements in tension, no one prevailing over others. Realist rituals of power, such as the double move, effect this tension.

To the extent that these rituals are competently performed and succeed historically on a global scale, they differentiate and administer international political space. They constitute state-bound fields of rationalist politics: the domestic communities wherein political practice is characterized by an innocent commitment to modernist narrative. At the same time, and in the same stroke, they constitute the historical space and subjectivity of a realist international political community: a field of modernist narrative that has lost its innocence, if you will. It is a space and subjectivity at the margins of rationalist discourse, affirming those margins, and actively aware of its marginality. It is a space and a subjectivity that retains its commitment to the modernist narrative of universalizing progress even as it engages in the ritual criticism of this narrative's historical limits. By the same token, to the extent that these rituals fail, the historical space of international political community is diminished. The sphere of realist power politics loses its power. It loses its capacity historically to define and enforce observance of the margins of modernist narrative, the legitimate span of state sovereignty, the boundaries of domestic political life. These boundaries, and the states they define, become themselves the objects of open, even violent political contest.

To speak in this way of a realist international political community is of course to take a position amidst the currents and antinomies of international theory.  For present purposes, though, what is especially important about this understanding of international political community is the challenge it poses for social scientists undertaking the critical analysis of advanced capitalist
society from a genealogical point of view. This challenge is a substantial one indeed. By way of conclusion, I want to highlight this challenge. Seven points, briefly developed, will suggest this challenge's dimensions.

First, critical analysis cannot proceed—as is so often the case in the “postmodernist” study of politics—as a strictly domestic inquiry. As the present discussion suggests, critical analysis must take up the never completed story of the geopolitical domestication of global political space (see Ashley, 1987b). It must take up the story of the power political making, maintenance, administration, and transformation of the practical boundaries of sovereign state rule—the boundaries separating a rational domestic order from the recalcitrant world beyond its sway. In so doing, it must take into account the historical and “transversal” exercise of realist rituals of power—the very rituals that constitute realist international community at the margins, the interstices, of rational order.

Second, this means that critical analysis cannot regard political realism as something opposed, external to, and constraining or conditioning the world historical development of capitalist society and its modernist ideology. Despite realism’s attempts to defer modernist narrative, thus demarcating historically its spatial limits, realist power politics must not be regarded as inimical to that narrative’s historical success. Despite the tendency to associate realism with a system of states whose “anarchic structure” is said to predate and condition the emergence of capitalism in Europe, realist power politics cannot be reduced (as Tilly, Skocpol, and Giddens tend to reduce it) to the status of an exogenous constraint on capitalist development, an antecedent condition, a hold-over from a premodern order.8

Rather, critical analysis should regard the partially autonomous community of realist power politics as the historically specific political relation—the global public sphere, as it were—of a world capitalist system. It is a community whose specificity inheres in its status as a historical supplement, in Derrida’s sense, to the autonomy of modernist narrative in capitalist life: on the one hand, realist power politics is a specific form of political community whose global power and practical autonomy depends, not upon a system of multiple states per se, but upon the simultaneous empowerment and practical delimiting of the rationalist understandings of community in multiple local settings; on the other hand, realist power politics should be grasped as a community whose normalized practices and rituals of power mobilize global resources, discipline practices, and thereby clear and delimit spaces of domestic politics wherein recognizably capitalist subjects can secure their dominance and the modernist narrative can establish its hegemony. There is, then, a strategic unity in the differentiation of practical spheres: the community of realist power politics depends upon the partial realization of the modernist narrative, and it provides the practical regime of spatial and political differentiation that makes the narrative effective within limited spans.

Third, in giving political realism an important place within world capitalist order, critical analysis must jettison the assumption of participants’ fundamental innocence of power politics. It must disown those conceptions that neglect the significance of knowledgeable political practices in effecting
the subjects, objects, modes of conduct, and resulting continuities that lend themselves to the name "capitalism." The relations of world "capitalism" cannot be adequately grasped, for example, as an external structure that exists independent of knowledge and will and that constrains human action. Likewise, these relations cannot be adequately comprehended as a uniform and unquestioned consensus that affirms the given order, denies opposing possibilities, and thereby effects a kind of "cloture," an apolitical resignation to the given order conceived as the necessary and natural order. Both approaches are inadequate. The former aligns with apologists for "capitalist" order in reducing a historical system to an abstract and essential ideal, a kind of second nature existing beyond the reach of practice. The latter views participants as "cultural dopes." Both approaches join modernists in the official stigmatizing of power politics as a dark and alien tradition—a vestige of a less rational order.

The order to which we give the name "capitalism" must instead be approached as a project whose historical success is dependent upon the competent and skillful action of knowledgeable subjects of a realist political community. Specifically, its success is dependent upon the practical differentiation, within its span, of a relatively autonomous field and subjectivity of realist practice: a subjectivity that eschews modernism’s official innocence of power, that is ever poised to perform rituals of power, that authorizes and orients the use of coercive means on a global scale, and that thereby has the effect of clearing and securing the practical space, the space of the modern state, wherein the modernist narrative can assume the status of an unquestioned truth. The historical success of world capitalist relations, one might say, is predicated on the transnational institutionalization, among statesmen, of what Foucault calls "a local cynicism of power." It is predicated on the global institutionalization of a practically effective historicist critique of capitalism’s own official self-understanding, its own anti-historical modernism. Realist power politics, although everywhere repudiated by champions of modernist narrative, is the institutionalized practical critique without which capitalist narrative could not become effective and without which the practical space of modernist narrative could not be globally secured.

Fourth, in assigning importance to knowledgeable actions of realist power politicians, the critical analyst must be on guard against a number of potential missteps and misreadings, many of which are fostered by rationalist understandings of the role of knowledge in social practice. To note the importance of knowledgeable actions in the reproduction of world capitalist relations is not to invest the "realist statesman" or any other subject with a totalizing theoretical understanding of the system and their places within it; it is not to assume that these subjects have full foreknowledge of the system-wide reverberations and consequences of their intentional acts; and it is not to resort to a conception of a system in which the intentional acts of statesmen or other subjects appear as the origin and end of all practice and the unique register of all truth and meaning.

To emphasize the importance of realist power politics, viewed as knowledgeable action, is to stress the significance of practical competence, not theoretically informed action. It is to suggest that the reproduction of world
capitalist relations cannot be adequately understood without reference to participants’ competent understandings and skillful deployments of cognitively structured practical schemes, dispositions, or rituals of power. Like the realist double move, or like the unspoken exemplary practices at work in Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigms,” these schemes or rituals are durable and transposable strategy-generating principles. They are unspoken, transferred through practice, and inscribed in habit. When skillfully brought into local play by competent parties, these schemes or rituals unite and circumscribe discursive and nondiscursive practices; differentiate fields of practice; give rise to subjects, objects, disciplinary divides, limits of understanding, and categories and material boundaries of social action; and enable agents to orchestrate diverse fields of action, regulate practice, discipline opposition, cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations, and maintain the given order of domination. They do all of this despite the absence of any mechanical determination of agents’ practices and despite their inability to anticipate the social consequences of their actions.

Fifth, the preceding points begin to give shape to a crucial puzzle in the critical analysis of world capitalist relations. The puzzle can be formulated in terms of a core question and a heuristic constraint on its answering:

- The question derives from a proposition implicit in the preceding four points: the community of realist power politics can be grasped as a sort of “multivalent paradigm” which differentiates global political space into a plurality of specific “idiomatic” subspaces and which, in so doing, sustains a richly variegated global public sphere in accordance with the prerequisites of privately controlled global production. Considered carefully, this proposition lays no small or simple task on the doorstep of a realist international community. Horizontally, this task involves the simultaneous authorization and empowerment of a multiplicity of national hegemonic forms: it involves the historical production of diverse definitions and distributions of political authority which, as national regime types, are capable of undertaking diverse political programs in a variety of unforeseen contexts. Vertically, this task involves the maintenance of an overall interpretive unity mediating and limiting the codevelopment of multiple national hegemonic forms: it involves the maintenance of an interpretive unity that specifically restricts the coevolution of national regimes to those hegemonic forms which, taken together in the form of their interaction, preserve predominant control over global production and exchange in the hands of international capital. The proposition thus prompts the question: How is this strategic objective accomplished? How is it that realist power politics performs this complex, subtle, and never finished task?
- The heuristic constraint, also implied by the preceding points, can be phrased both negatively and positively. Negatively, the constraint is that the realist performance of this task cannot be explained either by appeal to political actors’ originating and total knowledge of the system, including their knowledge of the far-reaching social consequences of their actions, or by assuming a concentration of political power sufficient to enact rationally such total knowledge, even if it existed. Appeals to conscious intentionality
are disallowed. Positively, the constraint is that the explanation is to be
found in the further analysis of the practical competencies of realist power
political community: in the local competent performance of realist rituals
of power and the unintended social consequences of those competent
performances.

In Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) language, this is a puzzle of the “orchestration
of collective actions and improvisations” in world capitalist society. In
Foucault’s (1982) language, it is a puzzle of a “strategy without a knowing
strategist.”10 In terms I use elsewhere (Ashley, 1987b), it is a puzzle of social
will formation on a global scale. In taking up this puzzle, critical analysis will
have to look to other realist rituals of power in addition to the double move
considered here. Foremost among these realist rituals, as I have elsewhere
contended, are those centering on the practical scheme of balance of power
(Ashley, 1984).

Sixth, a critical analysis focusing on the system-reproducing role of realist
power politics cannot evade the question of crisis and change. Crisis and
change—not some supposedly stable structures or institutions—must occupy
the very center of analysis. In part, this is because the anticipation of crisis is
part and parcel of realist international community, its rituals of power, and its
practical critique of modernism’s universalizing ambitions. Even as realist
rituals of power impose the historical limits of modernist narrative, the rituals
themselves find their justification in the expectation of the “imperialist”
 breeching of these limits.11 With a keen tragic sense, competent realist
statesmen undertake their rituals in order to discipline practices and
normalize boundaries, yet their every move is animated by the expectation
that their rituals will never wholly succeed, that boundaries will be
transgressed, that crisis and catastrophic change will occur. And when crisis
and catastrophe do occur, the occurrence confirms the realist’s anticipations
of failure and, with them, the need to invoke their rituals of power as means of
disciplining global time and space. Indeed, it is this institutionalized
anticipation of crisis, and the continuing readiness to orchestrate the
transnational use of force in response, that makes the partially autonomous
realist community so valuable in furthering an order that can be called
“capitalist.”

In larger part, though, crisis and change must occupy the center of critical
analysis because, as I say, the community of realist power politics is a
historical relation. As such, its practical space, its autonomy, and its power
are not given for all time; they must be won and tenaciously held in hazardous
political struggle under changing historical conditions. From a genealogical
standpoint, therefore, a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical
conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power and
undermined their capacities to preserve the space and the power of realist
international political community.

More pointedly, the critical analyst needs to ask: have developments in late
capitalist society—the internationalization of capital, the state’s increasing
responsibilities as economic dysfunction manager, the fiscal crisis of the state,
and the emergence of socialist states, to name four—conspired to expand the
range of “domestic” demands upon the “international” practices of
statesmen? Have these factors, together with the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals, deprived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power? Are statesmen suffering a consequent loss of the practical space within which to distance themselves critically from the one-sided rationalism of domestic society’s modernist narrative? Are we thus participating in the diminishment of that sphere of knowledgeable political practice and political innovation upon which the long-term success of capitalism has so much depended? In the idiom of Antonio Gramsci, are we in the midst of an “organic crisis” of global proportions—a world “authority crisis” occasioned by the displacement of the “hegemonic consensus,” the realist consensus, responsible for the political administration of time and space in world capitalist society?12

As it happens, there is plenty of evidence to support affirmative answers to these questions, and not the least of this evidence is to be found very close to home. It is to be found in the contemporary discourse of the experts, the professional interpreters of international relations. Evidence of crisis is present, for instance, in the unrestrained rationalism and economism increasingly characterizing the theory of international politics (Ashley, 1983). It is present as well in the “blurring of genres” between “politics” and “economics” in international studies (Ashley, 1983). Perhaps the most telling evidence is to be found in the ever-so-quiet exit from the scene of a tired and aging classical realist intelligentsia, which has not succeeded in producing a younger generation of inheritors in the United States. Almost unnoticed, the rich and tension-filled discourse of classical realism has been displaced by a wooden opposition between statist and internationalist schools of rationalist thought. On the one side, there are the champions of internationalist heterodoxy—transnationalists and world-systems theorists who give historic- and logical priority to social and economic processes transcending state boundaries. On the other side, there are the high priests of statist orthodoxy—one-time liberals who confuse realism with state-centered rationalism and thus see themselves as “neo-realists.” On both sides, there is a depreciation of history (Ashley, 1984, 1987b; Walker, 1987).

Seventh, no matter how strong the evidence of crisis, the appropriate response for the critical social theorist is not to adopt a Weberian pose, a pose of resignation. Critical analysis cannot come to rest with the demonstration that seemingly resistant traditions, such as political realism, participate in their own eventual undoing because they have the effect of fostering the very rationalist tendencies they are said to oppose and limit. To view realism or any other tradition in this way is to disable opposition. It is to join, however inadvertently, in the reduction of all history to a single story, the story of the “rationalization of politics,” of the universal normalization of political life within the sway of modernist narrative. So long as one’s grounds for critique are entirely within the ambit of that narrative, opposition is condemned to the endless rehearsal of modernism’s false promises.

World capitalism is world capitalism, no doubt, but the globally dispersed practices and effects so named cannot be adequately understood as a singular global projection of the modernist narrative and its struggles. Nor can they be adequately grasped as resulting from the collision among multiple modernist
projects, each but a special version of the discourse of Western reason. Thanks in large measure to realist practices, the "capitalist world" remains pluralistic. It contains multiple practical spaces, each granted its partial autonomy, its sovereignty, its effective claim on a right to a partially unique interpretation of the whole. It preserves spaces within its domain for alternative practices that are not reducible to mere variants of the same Western rationalist tradition. These are practices that have until now escaped the totalizing normalization of Western rationalist discourse. These are also resistant practices and movements that bear positive, productive potential—potential for the opening up of alternative spaces, for the constitution of alternative subjects, for the making of alternative worlds.

An important task for the critical analyst interested in historical change—the opportunity that international studies presents—is to locate these dispersed "endangered species" of resistant practices and explore how, under conditions of crisis, they might be strengthened (Dreyfus and Sullivan, 1982: 202–3). How, in particular, might programs of resistance appeal to the community of realist power politics and how might they deploy its ambiguous rituals, not for the sake of tradition, but in order to forestall the further extension of rationalist order and thereby to maintain the practical space in which alternative projects can be pursued? Can we discern possibilities, for instance, for modern-day Machiavellis of Third World self-reliance? Can we contemplate a revived nonalignment movement whose interest in autonomous development would give rise to a revised and more internationalist understanding of Third World nationalism—an understanding that embraces the realist understanding while departing from the contemporary "nationalist universalism" of advanced capitalist and socialist states? Can we imagine virtuoso socialist power politicians, sensitive to the time and tempo of history, skillfully moving to distance their practices from universalizing rationalist claims, and thereby depriving conservative forces of the rationales for forceful reaction against an allegedly imperialist movement? Can we discern opportunities for a strategic alliance between environmentalists sensitive to possible "limits to growth" and realist statesmen sensitive to the historical limits of rationalist order? Can we discern opportunities for an alliance between anti-nuclear movements and realist statesmen who rightly see in the totalization of warfare the negation of international politics? Might new alliances—new transversal blocs—effect the transformation of the practical significance of political boundaries? Might feminist movements, with their anticipations of new and more open modes of political subjectivity, contribute to the production and dissemination of transformed modes of sovereignty? Might a pluralistic security community be possible?

These are important questions, it seems to me. Together they illustrate the importance of Anthony Giddens' reminder to critical social theorists: "We should not cede tradition to the conservatives!" (Giddens, 1979: 7). This is especially the case with respect to the tradition, the discourse, of political realism. Political realism, I have suggested, constitutes a dominant modality of community on a global scale. Though threatened amidst the current crisis, it remains a global source of power. The job of the revolutionary is not to repudiate this community of power politics, for the repudiation of realist
power politics is the abnegation of a revolutionary resource. The revolutionary's job is instead to strengthen this community and competently perform its rituals while at the same time detaching realism from its moorings in capitalist experience. In Foucault's genealogical idiom, the job is a matter of doing interpretive violence to a tradition notorious for its celebration of violence. It is a matter of the violent and surreptitious appropriation of a realist community in order to impose a new direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game. It is a matter, in short, of participating in the making of history.

Notes
1. For discussion of these arguments see, e.g., Morse (1976), Herz (1976), Rosenau (1981), and Keohane and Nye (1977).
3. One might, for instance, take the position that international social and economic processes and relations are either negligible or entirely derivative of the interactions of multiple national economies—each coextensive with an associated national society each under the authoritative control of a state, and the several vying for the maintenance or extension of their autonomy and power. Such an approach, it should be clear, is not without its drawbacks. For one thing, this approach requires the critical analyst to concentrate exclusively upon those few societies whose position at the very center of world economic development makes it possible to treat them, at least for a time, as if they were self-sufficient national economies, isolated from external influences. It requires the exclusion of dependent, underdeveloped societies from the compass of critical inquiry, and it thereby sacrifices the ability to learn from those situations at the periphery where the consensual foundations of bourgeois culture are not inscribed in habit, where the arbitrariness of bourgeois culture is plain for all to see, where the contradictions of capitalist life are mostly sharply drawn, and where force, not consent, is the primary modality of discipline. A related drawback is that the adequacy of this approach is highly provisional even as it is applied to advanced capitalist societies. Its adequacy is provisional upon a condition for which the approach itself cannot account: the advanced capitalist society's maintaining its precarious position at the very center of world capitalist life.
4. On the notion of "differance"—according to which all spatial differences are understood temporally, as a deferring—see Derrida (1978, 1972). See also the discussion in Giddens (1979).
5. On the notion of misrecognition (meconnaissance) see Bourdieu (1977).
6. In particular, it can be read as an attempt to further develop one of Karl Deutsch's most important contributions to international theory. According to Arend Lijphart's (1981) discerning appreciation, Deutsch's work represents a revolutionary break from the "traditional paradigm" of international relations theory, a paradigm I would identify with the Western rationalist tradition. This paradigm, Lijphart suggests, plays on a dualism that is fundamental to rationalist political theory: the antinomy of anarchy and sovereign government, seen as opposites on a continuum from pluralism to integration. Pluralism, in this traditional paradigm, is regarded as anarchy—an absence of community—and a pluralistic sphere is seen as the mere space in which multiple communities collide or interact. Integration, when it occurs, is always understood to occur in the form of an "amalgamated security community," a rational unity finding its focus in a sovereign government. Thus, as Lijphart points out, theoretical arguments within the traditional paradigm tend to be played out on a continuum between world anarchy—which is characterized by insecurity and war among plural sovereignties—and world government—which is characterized by global peace under the rational aegis of a single sovereign. Against this background, the significance of Deutsch's contribution is quite plainly seen. Deutsch gives voice to a possibility about which the traditional paradigm
effects a disciplined silence. This is the possibility, arguably present in a forgotten "Grotian paradigm," that amalgamation and integration might not be coextensive and that pluralism and integration might not be mutually exclusive. Pluralism and integration might co-occur, Deutsch showed, in the form of a "pluralistic security community," a community consisting of multiple states in which there is a generally shared expectation of peaceful change.

What Lijphart calls the traditional paradigm is with us still. It is conspicuously at work, for instance, in the neorealist movement in international theory (Ashley, 1984). Somewhat more generally, it informs all of those currently fashionable attempts to generalize rationalist models of politics to the study of international relations (Ashley, 1983). And it is increasingly subject to criticism (Cox, 1984; Walker, 1984, 1987). Like Deutsch, I want to depart from the traditional paradigm. In my poststructuralist approach to understanding a realist international political community, I, like Deutsch, refuse the dichotomy of anarchy and rational community (difference and identity) that informs the vast preponderance of international theorizing. Like Deutsch, I want to attend to the historical making and practical significance of a pluralistic security community—or, better put, a pluralistic insecurity community. I find this transnational community in the multivalent discourse of realist power politics.

7. The term "transversal" is used by Foucault to refer to relations—struggles to impose authority, as against anti-authority struggles—that are not limited to one country. They might "develop more easily and to a greater extent in certain countries, but they are not confined to a particular political or economic form of government." The term is useful because it conveys much that attaches to the term "transnational," while avoiding the latter's tendency to invest authority in the national boundaries that are transcended, and because the term connotes relations across forms of government as well. See Foucault (1982: 211).

8. See Tilly (1975), Skocpol (1979), Giddens (1982, 1981). The problem in Tilly and Skocpol's writings, I think, is a tendency to rely upon an abstract and ahistorical understanding of capitalism consistent with its own reigning ideology. Capitalism thus appears as a purely economic relation, a form of production relations distinguishable from politics, the state, and the nation-state system. The nation-state system can only appear as an exogenous force, a limit, or a condition characterized (after Weber) in terms of its unique control over violence. It then becomes possible to advance the theme of the anarchic "structure" of international politics, the situational imperatives it imposes upon local development possibilities, and, hence, the causal priority of international politics over the development of capitalism.

Giddens more or less endorses this understanding, and in so doing he illustrates the trap international politics has laid for critical social theorists. Despite Giddens' announced intention to overcome the structuralist tendency to give priority to synchrony over diachrony, he finds himself describing the nation-state system from an objectivist standpoint. It appears as a "world-wide common denominator among political systems of otherwise widely variant complexions," and its most important element is its monopoly of the means of violence (1982: 128). To be sure, Giddens wants to understand this nation-state system historically, and he wants to give an account of its control of violence that draws links back to Marx's interpretation of the capitalist labor contract (Giddens stresses the "extrusion" of violence from the hands of the employers under the conditions of the capitalist labor contract). Yet, once emerged, this system looms before Giddens in pure synchrony, as an external enclosure that threatens to defeat revolutionary imagination. He writes:

We live in a "world capitalist economy," in which capitalist economic relations pertain on a world scale. But even more important, we live in a world nation-state system that simply has no precedent in prior history: in which a fragile equality in weaponry by the two major superpowers is the only brake upon the political anarchy of the international order. Marx thought he discerned a real movement of change—the labour movement—that would provide history's solution to the anarchy of the capitalist market and the degradation of work. But where is the dialectical process that will transcend the political anarchy that threatens us with universal destruction . . . ? The cunning of reason here seems to have deserted us (1982: 180).
Only a fool would counsel a rosy optimism in the nuclear age. I think, however, that despair in the face of the “structure of anarchy” plays into the hands of reaction. Critical social theorists, Giddens included, need to break decisively with the Weberian thematization of international politics—its projection of the thematization of domestic politics—and they need to stage their break along just the sort of lines that Giddens has so incisively described in other contexts. Not the ahistorical structure of international politics but the historical structuring practices of international politics merit the emphasis of critical social theorists.

9. On practical competence, including the role of generative schemes, see Pierre Bourdieu’s chapter, “Generative Schemes and Practical Logic: Invention Within Limits” in Bourdieu (1977: 5–6). Giddens’ discussion of practical knowledge, understood as cognitively structured practical dispositions, seems to me to owe a considerable debt to Bourdieu’s treatment of the “habitus” (as well as to Derrida’s treatment of the “structuring of structure”) especially insofar as Giddens, like Bourdieu, emphasizes the crucial role of unintended consequences in the structuring and reproduction of social practices.

10. There is room for considerable confusion on the question of volition and knowledge. To speak of “strategy without a strategist,” as Foucault (1982) does, or of “moves which are objectively organized as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention,” as Bourdieu (1977: 73) does, is to leave room for the less than generous inference that one is proposing to see power emanating “from the dark and mysterious backdrop of ‘history without a subject’” (Giddens, 1982: 221). It is to allow others to wonder aloud whether or not one has fallen prey to the view that “human affairs are determined by forces of which those involved are wholly unaware.” (Giddens, 1982: 222).

Properly read, neither Foucault nor Bourdieu can be said to deny the importance of volition and knowledge. The reading of Foucault by Dreyfus and Rabinow is instructive in this respect:

Power relations, [Foucault] claims, are “intentional and nonsubjective.” Their intelligibility derives from this intentionality. “They are imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives.” At the local level there is often a high degree of conscious decision-making, planning, plotting and coordination of political activity. Foucault refers to this as “the local cynicism of power.” This recognition of volitional activity enables him to take local level action fairly literally; he is not pushed to ferret out the secret motivations lying behind the actors’ actions. . . . Actors more or less know what they are doing when they are doing it and can often be quite clear in articulating it. But it does not follow that the broader consequences of these local actions are coordinated. The fact that individuals make decisions about specific policies or particular groups jockey for their own advantage does not mean that the overall activation and directionality of power relations in society implies a subject. When we analyze a political situation, “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them.”

This is the insight, and this is the problem. How to talk about intentionality without a subject, a strategy without a strategist. The answer must lie in the practices themselves. For it is the practices, focused in technologies and innumerable separate localizations, which literally embody what the analyst is seeking to understand. . . . There is a logic to the practices. There is a push toward a strategic objective, but no one is pushing. The objective emerged historically, taking particular forms and encountering specific obstacles, conditions and resistances. Will and calculation were involved. The overall effect, however, escaped the actors’ intentions, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them.”

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11. The realist, it will be recalled, makes room for a concept of imperialism, but it is not the imperialism of Lenin’s “highest stage of capitalism.” Morgenthau’s treatment is exemplary among realists. Dismissing what he calls “economic theories of imperialism,” Morgenthau defines imperialism as “a policy devised to overthrow the status quo,” where the status quo is the existing pluralistic order (whether global, continental, or local) and where “overthrow” involves the imposition of a singular political empire over the same.
domain. Morgenthau, like many realists, follows Schumpeter's line on the question of capitalism's essential innocence with respect to imperialism and war. Morgenthau writes:

> It has been the conviction of the capitalists as a class and of most capitalists as individuals that "war does not pay," that war is incompatible with an industrial society, that the interests of capitalism require peace and not war. For only peace permits those rational calculations upon which capitalist actions are based. War carries with it an element of irrationality and chaos which is alien to the very spirit of capitalism. Imperialism, however, as the attempt to overthrow the existing power relations, carries with it the inevitable risk of war (Morgenthau, 1978: 56).

What is noteworthy in this realist position is that it involves (a) an identification of capitalism as a historical social formation with the modernist narrative and (b) an insistence that capitalism, so identified, does not intrude upon the sphere of international political practice, which is to be interpreted solely in terms of the purposes and conditions of statesmanship. What we have here, in other words, is one more play of the realist double move. What we also have is a glimpse of why it is that realists become so very edgy whenever they find themselves in the presence of Marxist argument regarding international relations. It is not so much that realists are anti-Marxist, although the virulent anti-Marxism of some realists cannot be denied. It is that Marxist argument is a version of rationalist argument that says "that which must not be said." Violating a taboo that members of a realist community must honor but never name, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of imperialism penetrate a domain of silence that the realist double move would impose and, in so doing, they threaten to wreck the ritual practices by which the space of realist community is pried open and realist statesmen are empowered. The implications for "socialist statesmanship" are quite significant, but cannot be pursued here.


13. On the distinction between nationalism and nationalistic universalism, see Morgenthau (1978: 339):

> The nationalism of today, which is really a nationalistic universalism, has only one thing in common with the nationalism of the nineteenth century—the nation as the ultimate point of reference for political loyalties and actions. But here the similarity ends. For the nationalism of the nineteenth century the nation is the ultimate goal of political action, the end-point of the political development beyond which there are other nationalisms with similar and equally justifiable goals. For the nationalistic universalism of the late twentieth century the nation is but the starting-point of a universal mission whose ultimate goal reaches to the confines of the political world. While nationalism wants one nation in one state and nothing else, the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standard of action upon all the other nations.

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